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Abstract 
The following article argues that defence intelligence in general, and Britain’s Defence Intelligence 
organization in particular, represents an area in intelligence studies that is significantly under-
investigated.  It makes the case that the significance of understanding defence intelligence and DI lies 
not only in a general lack of illumination but because DI is subject to and prompts a range of 
difficulties and challenges that are either especially acute in the defence context or have 
ramifications for the wider intelligence community that remain to be fully appreciated.  Particular 
attention is given to DI’s remit being divided between Ministry of Defence and national requirements, 
problems of fixed-sum resourcing an intelligence function with national responsibilities that is 
subordinate to Departmental spending structures and priorities, fraught positioning of defence 
intelligence in Departmental line management and finally a chronic lack of public or official interest 
or scrutiny. The article concludes that the UK’s experience has echoes elsewhere, notably in the 
United States, and that wider international study of defence intelligence is both long overdue and 
may have implications for understanding of national and wider intelligence institutions and 
processes. 
The Neglected Handmaiden 
It is only slightly more than thirty years since the field of academic intelligence studies began to take 
a distinct disciplinary form with the nearly simultaneous appearance of its two principle non-
classified periodicals.2  In that period the volume, coverage, sophistication and impact of scholarship 
in the field have expanded quite literally by orders of magnitude.  And yet isolated lacunae and 
thinly covered shoals and sandbanks remain as often as near its heart as its fringes. One such body 
of shallows is the evolution, role and significance of defence intelligence.  The notion of military 
intelligence is, of course, a well-established one and the emergence of armed service intelligence 
functions is an accepted and highly conventional aspect of the highly developed national intelligence 
evolutionary narrative.3  Indeed, much of the early work on intelligence dealt with intelligence and 
war variously at the tactical, theatre or operational and grand strategic levels.4 And so it is more 
than a little surprising that very little attention has been paid to defence intelligence.  In the UK 
there is no official history of defence intelligence to match those of two of the three national 
agencies and the Joint Intelligence Organisation in the Cabinet Office5 or ‘officially indulged’6 
                                                            
2 Appearing c.1984, both Intelligence and National Security and the International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence are, of course, considerably predated by the originally classified US intelligence community 
journal Studies in Intelligence. 
3 This narrative is typified by Christopher Andrew’s seminal Secret Service: the Making of the British 
Intelligence Community (London: Sceptre, 1986) 
4  For example, the ground-breaking British official history, H. Hinsley et al British Intelligence in the Second 
World War 5 vols (London: HMSO, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1983, 1990) concentrated on theatre- or campaign-level 
intelligence and coordination at the national strategy level but avoided detailed engagement with intelligence. 
5 Christopher Andrew. The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. (London: Penguin,2010), Keith 
Jeffery. MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Michael 
Goodman The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee: Volume I: From the Approach of the Second 
World War to the Suez Crisis (London: Routlege, 2015).  
6 The author’s own review description of Richard J. Aldrich GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most 
Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperPress, 2010), see Philip H.J. Davies ‘Step Changes and Learning 
Curves in the History of British Intelligence’ Contemporary European History Vol.22 No.4 pp.687, 694, 
reviewing  
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independent academic history.  Despite achieving its fiftieth year in 2015 there has not even been a 
vaguely hagiographic and less vaguely self-congratulatory moment of celebration comparable to 
Charles Scanlon’s In Defence of the Nation: DIA at Forty Years.7  To be sure, Huw Dylan (also 
contributing to this issue) has provided an excellent account of DI’s lineal precursor, the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau8 and I have examined DI’s evolving position within the wider machinery of British 
national intelligence and in contrast with its US counterparts’ status and role.9  Beyond a (rather 
understandably) disgruntled post-Iraq memoire by one of its senior analysts 10 there are no 
monographs on UK Defence Intelligence after the 1964 Mountbatten Reforms.  
That being said, however, there is also hardly any substantial work on the Defence Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) in the United States beyond Scanlon’s contribution. Much the same might be said not 
merely of the other Five Eyes intelligence allies but of the lion’s share of other non-Anglophone 
systems with national agencies consuming more than just the lion’s portion of scholarly interest.  
This includes the much-examined Soviet and Federal Russian systems where the Glaveniye 
Upravleniye Razvedivatelniye (GRU) has remained a rarely and even then idiosyncratically treated 
side-topic11, almost as ignored as it is unreformed in the wake of the fall of the USSR.  And so the 
academic neglect of defence intelligence as sphere of inquiry is not a peculiarly British malaise, but a 
malaise of the entire intelligence studies enterprise.  As we shall see below, it is a neglect that 
reflects a long-running and wide-spread official neglect and mismanagement of a vital element of 
national security assets and capabilities.   
The Idea of Defence Intelligence 
Michael Warner famously warned intelligence scholars and practitioners alike that ‘If you cannot 
define a term of art, then you need to rethink something’12, echoing his 19th century compatriot 
Charles Pierce’s demand that philosophy serve to ‘make one’s meaning clear’.13  And so it is worth 
pausing a moment to clarify what exactly is meant by defence intelligence as distinct from national 
and other forms of intelligence.  As noted above, the notion of military intelligence – more precisely 
armed forces intelligence since, at least in the UK, ‘military’ historically denoted strictly the Army and 
War Office – is well established and well understood.  Military and naval intelligence branches date 
to the 19th Century with air force intelligence components appear in short order after the 20th 
century emergence of substantial and institutionalised air power.  Defence intelligence entities are, 
                                                            
7 Scanlon, Charles Francis. In Defense of the Nation: DIA at Forty Years. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2001). 
8 Huw Dylan Defence Intelligence and the Cold War: Britain's Joint Intelligence Bureau 1945-1964 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
9 Philip H.J. Davies Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: a Comparative Approach 
(Santa Barbara CA: Praeger Security International, 2012) passim  but Vol.2 in particular. 
10 Brian Jones Failing Intelligence: the True Story of How We Were Fooled into Going Into War in Iraq (London: 
Biteback Publishing, 2010). 
11 Leading accounts of post-Soviet intelligence restructuring such as Michael Waller’s Secret Empire (Boulder 
Co: Westview Press, 1994) and Amy Knight’s Spies without Cloaks: the KGB’s Successors (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996)  scarcely mention the GRU even though it alone emerged from the collapse of the USSR 
almost entirely unaltered, while the main Cold War vintage contributions on GRU by defector Vladimir Rezun 
writing as Viktor Suvorov can only charitably be described as merely ‘idiosyncratic’, see e.g. Soviet Military 
Intelligence (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) and Spetsnaz: the Story of the Soviet SAS (London: Grafton 
Books, 1989). 
12 Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence Vol.46, no.3 (2002) p.15. 
13 Charles Peirce How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” in Philosophical Writings of Pierce, ed. Justus Buchler (New 
York: Dover, 1955), p.25. 
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however, of a more recent vintage with most organisations badged as such appearing during or after 
the 1960s.   
Taking the British DIS and American DIA as points of departure, one sees two parallel and 
interconnected criteria for articulating the idea of defence intelligence.  The first is the collaborative, 
in management theory language ‘contributive’ 14 , sharing of raw intelligence and analytical 
judgements at a tri- or quad-service (when one includes civilian defence officialdom) level.  In the 
British case this developed to support tri-service joint planning in the 1930s under the auspices of 
the Chiefs of Staff apparatus that had taken shape in the second half of the 1920s15, and in the 
United States to support an analogous need although that did not become compelling until well into 
the Second World War.16  We may think of this as the joint intelligence agenda.  The second is the 
provision of intelligence support to unified and integrated tri-service leadership at the political, i.e. 
Cabinet, as well as command staff levels.  It is the emergence of amalgamation of armed services 
under overarching Ministries and Departments of Defence, with Cabinet defence political portfolios, 
which really drives the emergence of defence building on earlier peer-group joint intelligence 
mechanisms.   
Thus defence intelligence is perhaps most usefully thought of as quad-service intelligence 
production in support of defence as a corporate whole as embodied at the official level in a multi-
service command staff and unified defence political leadership.17  Seeing defence intelligence in 
these terms necessarily means identifying the function with strategic level of military doctrine, 
decision-making and policy.  It also implies that the role of defence intelligence in the national 
intelligence community naturally supports and parallels the role of the defence Cabinet portfolio in 
the wider armature and conduct of national security.  As will become apparent, however, these 
seemingly intuitive inferences present serious difficulties when putting defence intelligence and its 
associated agencies into practice. 
The Institution of Defence Intelligence 
Part of the problem for the UK is that when referring to Britain’s defence intelligence one is not 
really talking about a single entity but a collective or confederal intelligence-community-in-miniature 
that evolved into its current intricate form after the end of the Cold War.  Indeed, the multifarious 
nature of the defence intelligence function in the UK is one of the reasons for a series of puzzling re-
brandings since the mid-1990s. At the turn of the previous decade Michael Herman noted with a 
hint of puzzlement the MoD’s intelligence assessment hub being renamed Defence Intelligence 
                                                            
14 The term is coined by Tom Burns and George Stalker in their T. Burns and G.M. Stalker, Management of 
Innovation (London: Tavistock, 1961), pp. 120–2. 
15 Interestingly, this development has been well-documented in the public domain at least since the second 
half of the 1950s, see F.M.G. Wilson The Organization of British Central Government 1914-1956 (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1957) pp.297-298. 
16 Suggestive of the lack of regard to defence intelligence as much in the USA and UK, the definitive account of 
the wartime US Joint Intelligence Committee remains Larry Valero’s 'The American Joint Intelligence 
Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945–1947.' Studies in Intelligence unclassified edition, no. 9 
(Summer 2009) pp.65–80. 
17 This definition parallels, at a lower institutional level of analysis, that I proposed in 2012 for a definition of 
national intelligence as intelligence support to the government as a corporate whole (rather than, more 
narrowly but traditionally), intelligence in support of national security. See PHJ Davies Intelligence and 
Government in Britain and the United States: a Comparative Approach Vol. 1 p.25. 
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Assessment Staff (DIAS) from the long-standing and well-recognised DIS.18  This arose because after 
Front Line First the intelligence empire under the Chief of Defence Intelligence had been formally 
expanded to give him line management of an assortment of additional organisations that had 
previous stood as entirely separate agencies or formally separate agencies over which CDI had held 
tasking and a measure of supervisory authority at one remove in chain of command.19  As denoting 
CDI’s organisation, Defence Intelligence Staff now stood for a wider apparatus within which the 
assessment enterprise was merely one amongst equals, and not even first.  By 2010 it was felt that 
even this exercise in distancing had not been enough and the DIS ‘brand’ was still too identified with 
a coterie of tweedy analysts sequestered in the Old War Office Building (OWO) and the vague and 
ambiguous Defence Intelligence became the new collective identity for the CDI machine, a phrase 
that unhelpfully is now both generic and brand – with neither especially well understood outside the 
walls of MoD Main Building, OWO or the gleaming, new-fangled ‘floorplate’ of RAF Wyton. 
In essence, today’s Defence Intelligence is divided into two main divisions under CDI.  The first and 
more established identity is DIAS, the institutional formally known as DIS under the Mountbatten 
Reforms.  Headed by a civilian Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (D/CDI) at Director General (two 
star) level in current Civil Service grades20, this is the analytical arm of the agency staffed by a mix of 
armed service secondees and career civilians (many of whom are ‘retreaded’ retired service officials. 
In many respects, it has long being DIAS which has dominated the ‘brand identity’ of Defence 
Intelligence chiefly because the agency was (as will be examined in greater detail below) originally 
created to consolidate the collating and assessment work of the three Service Intelligence Branches 
and a somewhat experimental post-war quad-service assessment organisation, the Joint Intelligence 
Bureau. 
Michael Herman has provided a telling generic character sketch of the DIS ‘civilian’: 
Picture a retired service officer aged fifty-five.  As a younger man he had a good average 
service career, but a posting to intelligence was a self-confirming indication that he was not 
destined for the top prizes.  But he liked the work, took his pension at forty-five and 
continued the work as a civilian … He is a conscientious man and comfortable in a tight 
hierarchy in which he and his colleagues do the detailed analysis while those higher up the 
line draw on it for broad pictures … he is a modest man who does not claim to be a deep 
thinker about Soviet intentions and strategy. He enjoys getting the detailed analysis right 
and is respected for his expertise … Intelligence depends greatly on him, and for what he 
gives he is a bargain … But he fits into a service organisation not inclined to challenge 
military orthodoxy.21 
A younger generation of professional, career analyst has become a more prominent feature of the 
DIAS cohort since the 1990s, deep thinkers as much on analytic methodology as strategic and 
                                                            
18 Michael Herman Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001) p.68. 
19 PHJ Davies Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States Vol.2 p.253. 
20 In Civil Service ‘old money’ Director equates to Deputy Undersecretary of State (DUS); in today’s seniority 
currency the equivalencies are Permanent Secretary (unchanged) = 4/5*; Director General = Deputy Secretary 
(DUS) = 3*; Director = Undersecretary (AUS) = 2*; Deputy Director = Assistant Secretary = 1*; see,e.g. 
http://www.civilservant.org.uk/information-the_armed_services.html (accessed 30/10/2015). 
21 Herman Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp.249-250; 
the sketch in question is originally from an unpublished lecture in 1990. 
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defence issues22, but retired service personnel (as likely to be female as male, unlike Herman’s 
slightly dated sketch)  have remained the mainstay of DIAS. .  Nonetheless, it is not hard to see how 
the DIAS desk officer stereotype could easily be seen as constrictive not merely by an evolving 
analytical profession but by the senior leadership of an organisation increasingly involved in 
increasingly high-technology intelligence collection and processing. 
The other main branch of DI is a very different entity, and it is arguably that part of the agency least 
well served by Herman’s portrant. After the consolidation of CDI’s ‘empire’ most of the intelligence 
collection components were gathered together under a Director General Intelligence and 
Geographic Resources. This branch was reconstituted in 2005/6 as an Intelligence Collection Group, 
headed by a one star serving officer.23  However, after the restructuring of the MoD’s higher 
management under Lord Levene’s 2011 review of MoD organisation24 it was rebranded the Joint 
Force Intelligence Group (JFIG) to dovetail it into the establishment of Levene’s proposed Joint Force 
Command (JFC).  Headquartered at the Pathfinder facility at RAF Wyton, JFIG overseas a range of 
specialist collection and processing units such as the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (formerly 
the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre, DGIFC, [2013-2015], formerly the Joint Air 
Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, JARIC, [1947-2013]); the Defence Geographic Centre, DGC, 
(formerly the Military Survey); the Joint Service Signals Organisation (JSSO, a resuscitated version of 
the Cold War Composite Signals Organisation25) and a geospatial Engineers unit designation with the 
Joint Aeronautic and Geospatial Organisation or JAGO.  The lion’s share of DI’s manpower sits in 
JFIG, which is not surprising.  JARIC historically has been roughly the same size as DIAS while Military 
Survey/DGC numbers more than half again more than both DIAS and JARIC combined.26  There is 
generally less transparency surrounding defence intelligence matters in the UK than the national 
agencies, and so few specifics are available on the manpower of JSSO and JAGO, but all told JFIG is 
several times the size of its analytical counterpart.  Alongside DIAS and JFIG under CDI is the Defence 
Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) which includes the Defence College of Intelligence and the 
headquarters of the Army’s Intelligence Corps. 
Problems with and of Defence Intelligence 
Some two decades ago, Michael Herman went to some pains to point out the fact that defence 
intelligence represented a different class of problems from those conventionally identified as issues 
                                                            
22  PHJ Davies Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States Vol.2 p.253, ‘Defence Intelligence in 
the UK After the Mountbatten Reforms: Organisational and Inter-Organisational Dilemmas of Joint Military 
Intelligence’ Public Policy and Administration Vol.28 No.2 (April 2013)  p.208; Nick Hare and Paul Collinson 
‘Organisational Culture and Intelligence Analysis: A Perspective from Senior Managers in the Defence 
Intelligence Assessments Staff’ Public Policy and Administration Vol.28 No.2 (April 2013)  p.219. 
23 Philip H.J. Davies ‘Defence Intelligence in the UK after the Mountbatten Reforms‘ p. 206. 
24 Lord Levene of Portsoken  Defence Reform: an Independent Report into the Structure and Management of 
the Ministry of Defence (London: TSO, 2011). 
25 The CSO was the Cold War successor to the joint-service intercept Y Organisation that was originally set up 
in the 1920s.  See e.g. Richard Norton-Taylor and Hugh Lanning A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1980-1991 
(Cheltenham: New Clarion, 1991), Michael Herman Intelligence Services in the Information Age pp.180-190; 
Davies Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States vol.2 pp.20, 85-86; 131. 
26 Ministry of Defence ‘Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence: JARIC and Military Survey and Their 
Proposed Merger’ appended to House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Fourteenth Special Report 
HC930 (London: HMSO, 2000). 
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in intelligence conceptualisation and practice.27  Defence intelligence was not merely a specific 
subset of the classic problems but dogged by unique challenges arising from its position in 
government.  Herman’s diagnosis of the ‘problems of defence intelligence’ was, however, one 
shaped by the experiences and legacies of the Cold War encapsulated barely a half decade after that 
global nuclear stand-off had drawn to its close.  The most fundamental difficulty for defence 
intelligence, he argued, was that such institutions were subject to an intrinsic conflict of inflict 
arising from the fast that their institutional and political masters were the likely beneficiaries (or 
otherwise) of their intelligencers might reach.  Herman suggests something of a perfect storm in 
which the difficulties of acquiring information on military and strategic systems enshrouded by an 
adversary’s denial and deception measure created a miasma of uncertainty in which a military-
institutional inclination towards worst-case appreciations, pressure not to undermine considerable 
‘Western political capital invested in the Soviet threat’ – not to mention comparable financial capital 
likewise invested – converged with an ethos where ‘on the whole, it is more satisfying, safer 
professionally and easier to live with oneself and one’s colleagues as a military hawk than as a 
wimp’28 and the absence of a permanent, career cohort of professional analysts comparable to the 
national intelligence community.  The result was a problematic mix of under- and overestimates of 
Soviet strength in which the former, once discovered, provided added impetus to the latter. 
Such hazards of linked under- and over-estimation have continued to afflict defence intelligence, of 
course, as inquiries on both sides of the Atlantic concerning erroneous assessments of Iraqi non-
conventional weapon (and especially nuclear) development programmes prior to 2003 have clearly 
indicated.29  But to a very real degree the deepest problems associated with defence intelligence are 
of a different order and more fundamental than those highlighted by Herman.  Former DIAS analyst 
Brian Jones has reflected pointedly on the relationship between Defence Intelligence and central 
coordination through the Joint Intelligence Committee, a reflection coloured precisely by the 
chastening experience of the Iraq war.  In his view, the Cabinet Office intelligence machinery ‘Exists 
to coordinate the community and to ensure that assessments are independent of motives and 
pressure which may distort judgements … independent of the vested interests of those who collect 
intelligence and are likely to be biased in favour of their own inputs, and of those who might be 
biased to interpret the intelligence to match their own policies or prejudices.’  However, on technical 
and scientific matters, the JIC’s Assessments Staff rarely had relevant specialist know-how in-house, 
consequently ‘As the major repository of all-source intelligence and career intelligence analysts and 
specialists, the DIS was often the only knowledgeable and experienced contributor to the process. 
Thus the laudable concept of unbiased assessment was undermined’.30 
That being said, in recent years a range of no less fundamental and persistent problems have shown 
themselves as being even more formative to the development and current state of affairs in UK 
defence intelligence.  The principle such problems are those of the divided mandate which dogs 
most defence intelligence institutions regardless of nation or government, the economic problem of 
fixed sum resourcing, an endemic challenge to public expenditure but one intensified by DI’s divided 
                                                            
27 Herman Intelligence Power pp.240-256 
28 Herman Intelligence Power p.247. 
29 See, in particular, Lord Butler of Brockwell Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: 
TSO, 2004) and The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Report to the President (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2005). 
30 Brian Jones Failing Intelligence p.7. 
The Problem of Defence Intelligence 
 
mandate, and the problem of locating any defence intelligence entity simultaneously both beside 
and above single-Service intelligence functions within the defence institutional hierarchy. 
1. Divided Mandate 
The first truly pervasive problem of defence intelligence is that it is operationally and institutionally 
neither here nor there, so to speak.  It serves both Departmental and national requirements, 
priorities and political masters but operates under the enforceable line management of only the 
former and in some respects as least amongst equals when dealing with the latter.  DI is represented 
on the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee by the Chief of Defence Intelligence alongside the national 
agencies and their heads but as a slightly junior Departmental voice at three star or, in Civil Service 
‘old money’ terms Deputy Undersecretary, today’s Director General grade.  By contrast, the security 
and intelligence agency (SIA) heads and JIC Chair all hold Permanent Secretary status.  Even this level 
of seniority was recently placed in question by Lord Levin’s review of defence management in the UK 
where it was suggested that the Chief of Defence Intelligence be demoted to two-star level.31   
At the same time, defence intelligence activities and institutions sit a level above the operational 
intelligence coalface where the greater part of military intelligence work and its impact have taken 
place over the course of a generation dominated by expeditionary and counter-insurgency 
operations.  In 2015 the defence intelligence function is removed a step from the boom industry of 
military ‘intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’ (ISR) which has dominated so much of 
defence intelligence work, acquisition and development.  And while under a series of activist 
Directors the DIA has managed to leverage its centrality within the DoD and concentration of 
analytical and technical competencies to secure a more secure role within the US intelligence and 
defence communities32, the UK the function and institution alike seem ever more precariously 
balanced with future prospects characterised by decreased clarity and confidence even though 
investment elsewhere in the intelligence enterprise has been steadily increasing for two decades. 
It is important to stress that the fraught balance between the competing priorities of defence and 
national intelligence is not merely the consequence of national requirements been laid upon 
defence intelligence as a post-hoc or opportunistic use of assets and capabilities just because they 
are there. The central role of defence in wider national security means that the defence intelligence 
has a comparably central role to play in the production of national security intelligence.  In this 
sense, the tension is intrinsic to the defence role.  At the same time, diseconomies33 of scale in 
highly specialised and expensive – usually technical -- intelligence collection systems that are often 
most usefully located in the defence architecture (overhead reconnaissance being foremost such 
example) but generate product of national (or non-defence departmental) significance also means 
that such dual-use capabilities have to serve both uses to justify the expenditure.  To a certain 
degree, locating a particular system in the defence rather than, say, foreign affairs portfolio is more 
                                                            
31 Levene Defence Reform p.27. 
32 For D/DIA Ed Soyster’s and his principal successor James Clapper’s successes in leveraging their agency’s 
position within the DoD see Scanlon In Defence of the Nation pp.195-211, also Davies Intelligence and 
Government in Britain and the United States Vol12 pp.150, 308-311. 
33 By which I mean systems that would be prohibitively expensive to duplicate in different departments.  
Imagine, for example, the cost implications of creating parallel reconnaissance satellite programmes for 
political and military operational purposes in contrast with those of creating multiple centres for the 
recruitment and handling of covert human sources. 
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a question of accounting and line management (or political) nicety than inherent necessity.  Thus   
defence, and hence defence intelligence, have unavoidable national responsibilities that lie in some 
competition with defence-only interests.  On the one hand this creates a divided mandate, 
competing priorities and fraught lines of responsibility.  On the other, this creates serious resource 
management problems. 
2. Fixed Sum Resourcing 
While the resource management problems of defence intelligence arise from the same overall 
intrinsic tensions as those of the divided mandate, they occur at a different level of analysis and in 
ways that, more often than not, serve to intensify the problems of the divided mandate.  Over the 
decades, a commonly given defence for locating a range national intelligence capabilities and 
functions in the US Department of Defence is that they should be less vulnerable to budget cuts as 
smaller parts of a bigger budget than as small, visible, and vulnerable budget lines in their own right.  
While the jury might still be out on this in the United States, British experience shows clearly and 
depressingly that this argument absolute does not apply to Whitehall.  What British experience 
shows is that, in the difficult process of carving the (often shrinking) defence fiscal pie, intelligence is 
almost guaranteed to be first in line for financial predation against more concrete combat and 
combat support assets and investments, regardless of the scale or significance of national 
requirements and priorities that underpin DI’s significance in the larger machinery of government 
and bigger political picture. 
In 2011 Lord Levene noted that intelligence does not stand as a Top-Line Budget (TLB) in its own 
right within the MoD budget but is a line-item within the Central TLB where it ‘sits uncomfortably … 
in the absence of a natural home.’ 34 This also means that intelligence is vulnerable to discretionary 
alterations to its resourcing levels by senior MoD management than would be less the case were it 
enshrined as a TLB. The steady scaling back of DIAS since the end of the Cold War has widely been 
reported and frequently decried.  DIAS came out of that conflict with an approximate strength of 
800, only to be pared by in the latter half of that decade to 600.35 By 2008 this had dwindled even 
further to 450.36  Despite being one of the only intelligence agencies to emerge from Iraq with its 
reputation intact after the 2004 Butler review37, in the midst of the post-2006 Taliban resurgence in 
Afghanistan and the run up to the 2009 ‘surge’ in that theatre, DIAS saw its numbers due to be 
reduced a further 20%.38  It was thus reduced in manpower (to little more than 400) and in morale39 
that DIAS came into the current decade to be confronted with the so-called Arab Spring, re-
mobilisation of ISTAR and logistical elements to support the French in Mali and the Central African 
Republic, and during the last two year resurgent Russian aggression in the Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine. 
Less visible was the whittling down of geospatial (GEOINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) 
capabilities during much the same period.  The status of IMINT and GEOINT has been a fraught one 
                                                            
34 Levene Defence Reform p.45. 
35 Herman Intelligence Services in the Information Age p.71; Michael Smith New Cloak, Old Dagger pp.202-204. 
36 Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2007-2008 (London: TSO, 2008) p.41. 
37 Butler Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction  passim. 
38 Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2007-2008 p.42. 
39 Hare and Collinson ‘Organisational Culture and Intelligence Analysis’ p.223. 
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for decades40 and a recurrent point of complaint by successive Intelligence and Security Committees 
who have consistently argued for greater autonomy or even national status for the function.41  
Between April 2000 and June 2006, the MoD experimented with an amalgamated imagery and 
mapping organisation analogous in some respects to the US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
(NGIA).  Headed at one-star level by an Air Commodore, the Defence Geographic & [sic] Imagery 
Intelligence Agency (DGIIA; later the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Agency or DGIA) essentially 
created an additional layer of management on top of JARIC and DGC.  From 2002 to 2005 the 
operating costs of DGIIA were reduced steadily from £144,766 in 2002-3 to £141,902 in 2003-4 and 
in 2004-5 to £130,430.42  Slightly bizarrely, this decline covered not only the intensified level of 
activity immediately after September 11, 2001 and the early stages of Operation HERRICK in 
Afghanistan but also the British contribution to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Operation TELIC.  Indeed, 
2003-4 saw some (albeit limited) increased in spending on ‘operating activities’ of £3,191 over the 
TELIC period – even though overall spending was being reduced by only slightly less (£2,874) – only 
to have that expenditure drop to below 2002 levels the following year.43  Only slightly less striking 
than the pattern of reduction during a period of much heightened military operational activity and 
generally raised threat levels is the very small sums covered by the entire imagery and mapping 
enterprise and their fluctuations. 
The essential point to be gleaned from these indicators is that intelligence spending where 
controlled by the MoD consistently takes a low priority in Departmental financial priorities as 
compared with other combat operational spending priorities – even during times of conflict or crisis.  
By comparison, the SIA increased from around £940 million to £1,126 million during the same 
period.44  Driven by the particular tooth-to-tail spending priorities of the armed forces, intelligence 
resourcing as actually far more vulnerable within a Departmental budget than national intelligence 
has been as a high-profile, stand-alone budget line. 
3. Institutional Hierarchy 
A troubled question on both sides of the Atlantic has been the relationship between defence 
intelligence agencies and the various single-service intelligence branches of the armed forces.  Both 
DIS and DIA were established with a similar organisational aim, but driven by very different 
considerations and contexts that are almost archetypical of the evolution of the two intelligence 
communities.  In both cases, the proposed defence intelligence organisation was intended to take 
the shape of a hostile take-over of armed forces intelligence from the corporate centre of defence, a 
merger that would have seen the independent headquarters of the service intelligence branches 
dismantled and the those branches abolished as separate agencies.  In the US, Secretary of Defence 
Robert McNamara was motivated to abolish the separate service intelligence agencies in order to 
mitigate or do away with the Zegartesque intelligence cacophony of competing service views and 
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interests with which he found himself confronted on taking office.45  By contrast, in the UK, 
amalgamating the service intelligence branches was seen primarily as a cost-saving measure, in parts 
by reducing executive and senior working-level salaries and overheads, doing away with parallel 
administrative architectures and finally identifying and eliminating any redundant activities across 
the three service intelligence branches and the post-war, quad-service Joint Intelligence Bureau.46  In 
the United States that hostile take-over was an almost complete failure leaving DIA and its Director 
all but surplus to requirements – except as a stalking horse for DoD institutional rivalries with the 
civilian intelligence agencies like the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and 
(especially keenly) the Central Intelligence Agency -- until the cusp of the 1990s.  In the UK, however, 
the effort was only too successful with Britain really only awakening to the unintended 
consequences of that putative success a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War. 
Both Peter Davies47 (a contributor to this volume) and myself48 have, separately and elsewhere 
examined how British plans to amalgamate the individual Service intelligence branches (SIBs) into 
the Defence Intelligence Staff took place, and how for an interval DIS simply entailed placing the SIBs 
under a common MoD line management with JIB.  This did not last long, and under an organizational 
doctrine called ‘functionalization’ the top managements of the three SIBs and their staff 
organisations were abolished and the single-serve geographical and functional sections 
amalgamated under a Directorate of Service Intelligence (DS Int).  The theory was that Service DS Int 
representatives would produce the single-service appreciations for their respective chiefs of staff 
that the defunct SIBs had existed to provide with the advantage of being able to draw jointly on the 
resources and views of collocated colleagues from the other Services and former JIB.   
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the focus of DIS was intelligence support at a joint 
level to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoS) and to Ministers, essentially as a strategic asset.  And so 
while the DS Int sections existed in principle to provide continuity of single-service intelligence 
support, as a whole DIS and its senior management were beholden to central defence requirements, 
such as those articulated from the 1980s under the NATO Collection Coordination and Requirements 
Management (CCIRM) process.49  Unsurprisingly, this applied a competing pressure upon the single 
Service responsibilities of the DS Int sections which reduced the relative importance  of both 
strategic and operational intelligence support in their workflows.  Over the subsequent decade, the 
doctrine of withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ dismantled the most of the UK’s deployed defence and 
joint military operational intelligence arrangements such as the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far 
East), Joint Intelligence Bureau (Far East) and Joint Air Reconnaissance (Far East) based at Phoenix 
Park in Singapore and, closer to home (and technically west of Suez), a scaling down of their 
counterparts in Cyprus such as JARIC (Near East) and the Middle East version of the JIB.  
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Consequently, just as the headquarters service intelligence functions were reducing their 
engagement in potential theatre- or campaign-level intelligence support to operational commanders 
the permanent, deployed operational intelligence architectures were also being dismantled. 
As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere50, by the end of the 1970s, only the British Army 
retained a permanent, career-path intelligence trade in its Intelligence Corps and even that was seen 
in the first instance as tactical in the first instance and then operational in its work for elements such 
as the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR).51  With the loss of ACAS(I) and DNI neither the Royal Air 
Force nor the Navy had either a standing single-service operational intelligence function or an 
intelligence trade.  With the Army seen as colonising the lion’s share of joint intelligence 
appointments simply because of its available pool of Int Corps professional intelligence 
practitioners52, and the sobering lessons of the intelligence demands of the First Gulf War, the Royal 
Air Force set about re-establishing a single-service Air Intelligence Centre at its Air Warfare Centre at 
RAF Waddington.  It took the embarrassing political fall-out of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
small-boat swarming attack on a boarding party from HMS Cornwall in March 2007 to give urgency 
and impetus to a previously moribund 2005 initiative to re-establish a Naval Intelligence or N2 
function within the Navy.   
The result has been establishment of a suite of single-Service intelligence fusion centres (the Air 
Warfare Intelligence Centre, Land Intelligence Fusion Centre and Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Centre) alongside a central, strategic joint defence intelligence apparatus (DI in general and DIAS in 
particular). There is a degree to which, in the second decade of the 21st Century, it seems that the UK 
has returned to a version of the status quo ante prior to 1963.  If this is the case, however, this 
reflect less a failure of the central DI apparatus as such than the unintended consequences not 
merely of creating a central defence but also abolishing separate SIBs in the process.  And for all the 
degrees to which the US DIA can be said to have fallen short of its original promise of a coordinated 
and coherent defence and military intelligence enterprise (until Soyster’s term as D/DIA), at least the 
US avoided decapitating its own permanent operational intelligence capabilities.  In the UK, it 
appears, the one joint intelligence relationship that remains to be firmly worked out and bedded in 
is that between central and single-service intelligence functions within the MoD. 
4. The Problem of Indifference 
A persistent issue throughout the evolution of Defence Intelligence in Britain has been the lack of 
independent scrutiny.  Ironically, the supposedly secretive national agencies have had clear and 
more robust regulatory, oversight and accountability frameworks from the old 1985 Interception of 
Communications Act to the 1994 Intelligence Services Act than have ever been applied to military 
and defence intelligence elements.  To be sure, over a decade the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) managed to extend its remit informally to cover defence intelligence as well as the 
                                                            
50 PHJ Davies ‘Defence Intelligence in the UK after the Mountbatten Reforms’ pp.208-209. 
51 Like much on the military intelligence front after the Second World War, the Intelligence Corps is woefully 
underexamined. For one of the few, dated and imperfectly informed attempts to articulate the role of the ‘Int 
Corps’ see e.g. Peter Gudgin MI? Military Intelligence: the British Story (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989) 
pp.83-86 and historically Jock Hasswell British Military Intelligence (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1973). 
52 Private information. 
The Problem of Defence Intelligence 
 
central intelligence machinery in Cabinet Office53, a reach only formally placed on a statutory footing 
under the 2013 Justice and Security Act.54  But the ISC’s original remit was purely concerned with the 
national agencies alone.55  To a limited degree, some of the slack has been taken up by other 
Parliamentary committees.  The most visible such case in the late 1990s was the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee’s damning report on the stillborn, £41 million TRAWLERMAN computer 
system intended for DIS.56 In terms of on-going oversight and transparency, however, much of the 
most significant discussion of defence and military intelligence matters has been provided by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Defence.  This body has produced a number of reports on 
defence intelligence and ISTAR concerns over the last two decades.57  However these have received 
significantly less attention that the reports produced by the ISC even though they touch on areas of 
comparable security sensitivity and strategic significance (such as the IMINT special relationship with 
the USA or JARIC performance during specific campaigns such as Kosovo).58  It is hard to imagine 
either the CIA’s analytical Directorate of Intelligence, IDAS’s natural counterpart, or the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, analogous to JARIC/DIFC, being so asphyxiated by persistent and 
pervasive public and political indifference. 
The problem of scrutiny and lustration for DI is not the hoary old image of rogue elephants 
rampaging off the political reservation but the less dramatic but more practical and common one of 
value for money.59  If an organisation or function is insufficiently resourced, that can reach a level 
where even that investment made is insufficient to meet even the minimum requirements laid upon 
it because it below a minimum working threshold.60  At that point, even that bare-bones investment 
becomes a wasted expenditure because the benefits yielded no longer justify that money or 
manpower.  As we have seen, the ISC has repeatedly warned that DI is not resourced sufficiently to 
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meet its combination of national and Departmental requirements – let alone operational intelligence 
demands in-theatre – and the Commons Defence Committee has challenged the relative investment 
in analysis and exploitation as against collection.  But these moments of lustration have historically 
been relegated on the fringes of these committees’ interests.  Even after changes under the 2013 
Act, public furores such as domestic Jihadi violence and the Edward Snowden allegations have 
absorbed most public attention and the scarce investigatory resources of both standing and ad hoc 
oversight bodies.61 At the same time, the formal expansion of the ISC’s remit under the 2013 leaves 
a possible question mark over whether the Commons Defence Committee will see any point in 
producing future reports on ISR/ISTAR and defence intelligence.  This suggests a risk that defence 
and military intelligence are more rather than less likely to fall into the gaps between the various 
oversight processes of today’s putatively more transparent British government. 
Prospects and Implications 
Both the divided mandate and resource allocation issues have been principle points of discussion 
when DI has received attention from commentators and official reviews alike.  As has been noted, 
the Intelligence and Security Committee has raised these issues with dogged regularity, and even 
repeatedly raised the possibility of cross-subsidising work conducted in support of national 
requirements and priorities from the Single Intelligence Account.  Although this proposal would both 
take a substantial volume of DI work off the defence spending account while also firewalling national 
work from the fixed-sum spending pressures that affect the MoD it has consistently achieved little or 
no traction.  It has been suggested in some quarters that there is a concern amongst the national 
agencies that this would involve taking SIA funds away from the agencies thereby weakening 
investment in those organisations.62  This suggestion has, however, little credibility.  Cross-subsidy 
proposals have never been about reallocating money away from the agencies but about taking funds 
already directed towards intelligence in the MoD’s Central TLB and managing them through the SIA 
instead.  It is hard, therefore, to see why cross-subsidy suggestions have fallen on such stony ground, 
unless Defence officials are simply resistant to seeing any MoD funds redirected elsewhere – 
perhaps even, in the bleakest scenario, precisely so that DI-earmarked moneys provide a nest egg 
that can be raided for other needs as and when. 
The institutional hierarchy problem is still in flux, and the future of DIAS deeply in doubt.  As noted, 
the three armed service components have effectively had to re-established service intelligence 
branches under the guise of the buzzword-friendly rebranding of ‘fusion centres’.  Less obvious is the 
impact on DIAS.  Rather than returning to a revivified Kenneth Strong JIB formula, DIAS appears 
increasingly balkanised with the all-source task evolving into a distributed rather than concentrated 
function.  While a sizeable portion of DIAS still sits in the OWO, that  component of the organisatoin 
has been under pressure to relocate for some time while MoD finance managers seek to realise the 
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real estate value of the central London real estate upon which it resides.  More crucially, one part 
has moved into the MoD Main Building to provide operational intelligence support to the Chiefs of 
Staff, another has moved to Joint Force Headquarters at Northwood and still another portion is 
being relocated to join the Pathfinder enterprise at RAF Wyton. In this setting, these DIAS elements 
fall under some very diverse dual-control line management between D/CDI as head of DIAS on the 
one hand, and the headquarters authority of the Defence Staff in London, CO of JFC in Northwood 
and Commander, Joint Force Intelligence Group at Wyton respectively.  Apart from acting as a shop 
steward for the all-source profession, it is increasingly hard to see what real authority D/CDI can 
wield over the work and conditions of the further flung parts of his organisation.   
In fact, if one looks at the recent evolution of all-source analysis as a taught skill set of principles and 
analytical techniques (structured or otherwise), the work of DIAS looks less and less like the kind of 
thing that needs its own organisational silo and more like a suite of supplementary skills that can be 
incorporated into the skill-sets of more technologically and professionally distinct intelligence 
disciplines and organisations.  The future for defence intelligence assessment appears less of 
institutional reform or adaptation than a more fundamental transformation into a fluid and 
constantly shifting network of analytic cells, project teams and task forces.  D/CDI might survive as a 
sort of ‘head of profession’, but it seems increasingly unlikely that DIAS, or an equivalent, as such will 
continue to exist within a decade or so.  The more plausible scenario is an almost transient, 
peripatetic community of all-source practitioners liable to re-tasking and relocation around 
Whitehall, mainland UK headquarters and deployed commands bound together not by a common 
line management but common training and methods inculcated by programmes like the Defence 
Intelligence Assessment Course at the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) at Chicksands. 
It is more than ironic that less secrecy surrounds the Secret Intelligence Service than Defence 
Intelligence, that SIS should be more a household name as MI6 than any actual military or defence 
intelligence element.  Like so many of the failures to deal with the difficulties and dilemmas of 
defence intelligence in the United Kingdom, it is a tragedy and one played out over decades where 
the cost in blood and treasure has been largely overlooked or ignored by the public, press and 
politicians alike.  But there are reasons to believe that this is not peculiar to the British experience.  
As has also been noted above, counterpart issues and concerns are readily discerned when setting 
the UK’s experience against that of the USA, and it would seem likely therefore that these problems 
are likely to be more widespread. A major consideration is the degree to which defence ministries 
encompass their own proprietary intelligence communities composed of various single-service, joint-
service and defence intelligence components.  How these sub-communities, almost in the 
sociological sense intelligence subcultures 63 , and perhaps other departmental intelligence 
subcultures, relate within themselves as well as to the central, national intelligence apparatus 
remains an area that warrant far deeper investigation globally, not just in the Anglosphere and 
amongst its allies. It is also evident that close examination of defence intelligence institutions casts 
the so-called ‘intelligence community’, both in terms of national intelligence institutions and as an 
interagency enterprise across government, as a corporate whole in a very different (and often less 
flattering) light than studies focused exclusively at the national level.  The study of defence 
intelligence therefore has the potential the play the role of what Talcott Parsons has referred to as a 
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‘residual category’64 or Thomas Kuhn’s notion as an ‘anomaly’65, that is, a problem on the flanks of a 
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